The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention, and Trial
Roger J. Traynor

We recall on this occasion not only Justice Cardozo's surpassingly noble
spirit and imaginative genius, but his concern that judicial decisions
evince a reasoned consideration of their far-reaching consequences. We
can pay no better tribute to his sense of professional responsibility than
to consider together the far-reaching consequences of judicial decisions
in our own day on the now crucial problems of criminal procedure.
Lawyers as well as laymen often voice extreme views on the problem
of crime in the catch phrases of the day, and today's vogue is to pitch
them at courts. A giant problem is in no measure solved, however, by
indiscriminate charges that the courts have a predilection either for
coddling criminals or for depriving those suspected of crime of whatever due process is due them. We might better concern ourselves with
reinforcing the words of Mr. Justice Clark: "There is no war between
the Constitution and common sense." 1
Certainly there need be no war. It could break out at any time, however, unless we succeed in bringing constitutional doctrines down to
earth on the homely local scenes. That may prove even more of a challenge than the launching of such doctrines, for landings often call for
more skill than takeoffs.
It is no secret that we have had some spectacular takeoffs in recent
years. Our concern with pretrial criminal procedure has correspondingly grown in the time span encompassing the McNabb-Mallory2 doctrine on limiting prearraignment interrogation to foster prompt arraignment, the Mapp3 decision extending to states the rule excluding
evidence obtained from unconstitutional searches and seizures, and the
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1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
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recent constellation of cases that includes the limelighted Escobedo4
case extending the right to counsel to the pretrial stage.
Amid the vociferous and often irresponsible castigation of courts for
their zealous watch on due process, we do well to remember what a
void the United States Supreme Court's rules have filled. The fault lies
with the public, and particularly the legal profession, that constitutional rules have so long remained the major script of criminal procedure. In a wilderness all too little regulated by statutes the Court has
been compelled to formulate such rules out of cases that have come
before it at random. Now at long last these rules are bestirring legal
groups to tackle long needed revision of criminal procedure on a comprehensive basis. Thus the American Bar Association has embarked on
a thoroughgoing survey of the whole field 5 and the American Law Institute has recently completed a tentative draft of a Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure. 6 Such projects, together with the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964,7 may well give an impetus to state legislation. We
can welcome such projects even while regretting their tardiness, but we
know they may take a long time to mature or even to materialize.
Meanwhile, it is urgent that we stabilize our course for the duration.
Such studies are better late than never, but there is still a penalty
for long neglect. We now confront a long interim of living with the
present conglomeration of federal and state rules, a devil's brew that is
brewing wildly. Moreover, we must somehow find rational ways of
applying constitutional rules of olympian tenor to varied and ever
changing local scenes, where even law enforcement officers range from
the scrupulously lawful to the soddenly lawless. The best of them are
likely to grow impatient with recurring messages that loom to them,
rightly or wrongly, as outlandish. Nothing is more unnerving to those
amid the flak on the front lines than to receive commands of constitutional force phrased in unmistakably unclear language. In their view
the courts are throwing the books at them, books that strike them of a
weight either confoundedly heavy enough to leave them lightheaded or
confoundedly light enough to leave them heavyhearted. It is difficult
to determine the nature and extent of their wounds, but from the outcry there is no doubt about their pain and suffering.
As for the United States Supreme Court, it too encounters frustra4 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
5 See LAFAvE, ARREsT: THE DEcIsioN To TAKE A SUsPrcr INTO CUSTODY (1965); NEWMAN, CONVIcrION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRLAL (1966).
Three other books are in preparation.
6 ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
7 18 U.S.C. § 8006A (1964).

1966]

Devils of Due Process

tions whenever it goes beyond its relatively simple task as monitor of
the federal administration of criminal justice. When federal criminal
procedure is at issue it can formulate appropriate rules of nonconstitutional reach." It has no comparable flexibility, however, in dealing with
cases involving state criminal procedure; then its only recourse is to
beam forth messages with constitutional radiations.
The sympathetic who hope that those on the front lines will get well
from their bouts with the books and that the supreme wordspinners
will get better, often overlook the third market for sympathy where
huddle the middlemen who must establish a working pax in bello
between the pacific skywriters and the bellowing front lines. It falls
regularly to the state judges and recurringly to federal judges to expound with common as well as constitutional sense the skywriting that
at times dots just enough t's to cross the eyes, but trails off on the if's,
and's, and but's. The loftier the message and the more removed from
the local scene, the more difficult it is for the judges on the ground to
work out the ground rules. If they fail to transpose the message into
earthy language, either because of their own ineptitude or because the
message itself defies transposition, it continues to plane in the stratosphere with ill effect to itself as well as to those who are grounded. A
rugged constitution, by definition the law of the land, suffers a loss of
vitality when it must circle in thin air indefinitely.
Such circling is sometimes envisaged in terms reflecting the experimental temper of an age in which even the scribes of advertising describe their efforts as running something up a flagpole to see who
salutes it. Presumably they can promptly run it down again if there
are no salutes. In contrast, when the United States Supreme Court
runs up a message, we are all bound to give it our respects, so that at
first thought it hardly seems of experimental character. There are
times, however, when no one has any clear idea of what respects we
are supposed to give. An intriguing conjecture has gained currency
that the Court has no clear idea either, but that it wisely awaits a variety of responses from the landlocked, which it can then ponder at
leisure with a view to amplifying or contracting the import of its original message. 9 It does not specify at the outset what responses will be
valid, so the conjecture goes, because it thereby impels courts in every
8 E.g., the McNabb-Mallory rule, based on the Court's supervisory power, is not binding
on the states. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342
U.S. 55, 63-65, 73 (1951); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 738 (1948) (dictum). See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-01
(1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
9 Cf. BicKEL, Curbing the Union, in POLMCS AND T=E WARREN COuRT 146 (1965).
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region to think their way out of the ensuing problems and thus to
serve as experimental stations of constitutional hypotheses. It is then
free to confirm or reject, in the best interests of the nation, local interpretations of its language.
There is some poetic justice in compelling state courts to resolve in
more than provincial terms the problem of policing the community
without oppressiveness. Had all state courts taken the initiative in that
regard there would have been less need for the United States Supreme
Court to become involved in policing the police. There might have
been little need at all, had state legislatures undertaken to formulate
modem standards of police procedure, or had all police departments
undertaken to raise their own standards. The cases that were fought
all the way to Washington brought us slowly to the realization that the
Court was moved to act, for better or worse, faute de mieux. 10
We know how circumspectly, sometimes all too circumspectly, it
has moved in some areas. Thus it took over thirty years, from 1932 to
1963, to develop the right to counsel at the trial and on appeal. Subsequent to Powell v. Alabama" and Johnson v. Zerbst12 there came the
limiting Betts v. Brady'3 rule in 1942, on which the Court marked
time with eroding exceptions 14 before overruling it at last in Gideon
v. Wainwright'5 and extending the right to counsel to appeals in
Douglas v. California.16
The Court also made haste slowly, though with more reason, to extend to the states the rule excluding evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures.'7 It is a rule of enough basic worth to
merit our characterizing it as the bon petit diable of due process iri
criminal detection. The states had abundant notice that it was on the
way. In a critique of Mapp v. Ohio, I noted:
By 1961, roughly half of the states had adopted the exclusionary rule, with local variations. There was no uniformity
of interpretation, however, and less than consistency in either
the federal or state gloss of the rule. There emanated from
the federal cases a sensitivity to federal-state relations that
10 See Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017 (1965).
11 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
13 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14 See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. C. REV. 211,
251-61; Kamisar, Book Review, 78 HAv.L. RFv. 478, 481-82 (1964).
15 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
17 See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 1.
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goes far to explain the willingness of the United States Supreme Court to afford the states ample time and latitude to
determine how to enforce the right it had announced in Wolf
v. Colorado in 1949. However guarded the Court was about
state remedies, it left no doubt that the right was of constitutional dimension, for "Security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause."
It was quickly apparent that this otherwise eloquent declaration went limp on the key word enforceable. In many states
there had not yet loomed any effective remedies to attend the
right that loomed so large. Wearing its rich constitutional
cloak, it went begging for recognition. Alone of the princely
rights it often went begging in vain. It became a classic right
without a remedy. In California six years elapsed between
Wolf v. Colorado and People v. Cahan, and all during that
time we were painfully aware of the right begging in our
midst. We remained mindful of the cogent reasons for the
admission of illegally obtained evidence and clung to the
fragile hope that the very brazenness of lawless police methods
would bring on effective deterrents other than the exclusionary rule. Accordingly we were proceeding with caution before
responding to the message in Wolf v. Colorado, to the long
and short of the handwriting on the distant wall. We needed
no more than Irvine v. Californiato read the handwriting on
our own wall. In the interim between Irvine v. California
and People v. Cahan it became all too clear in our state that
there was no recourse but to the exclusionary rule. In the interim between Irvine v. California and Mapp v. Ohio a like
reflection of nation-wide import must also have been developing in the Supreme Court of the United States. Its decision
in Irvine had intimated a hope that in time the many states
still uncommitted to the exclusionary rule would reconsider
their evidentiary rules in the light of the Wolf doctrine that
the fourth amendment is enforceable against the states
through the fourteenth. The indifferent response must have
been disheartening to a Court that had expressed its reluctance to invoke federal power to upset state convictions based
on unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
The many states that failed even to re-examine their evidentiary rules merely postponed the day of reckoning. They
had clear warning in Irvine that if they defaulted and there
were no demonstrably effective deterrents to unreasonable
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searches and seizures in lieu of the exclusionary rule, the
Supreme Court might yet decide that they had not complied
with "minimal standards" of due-process. When in 1961 it so
decided in Mapp v. Ohio and made the exclusionary rule
mandatory in all states, it could hardly have taken anyone
by surprise. For all their distracting, discordantly nay-saying
chimes, the hours had been successively striking that the zero
hour was coming.' s
Of late, however, we can no longer say that the hours have been
successively striking to give states warning that the zero hour is coming.
They seem to be striking all at once, as though there were gremlins
intent on their own solos in the clockworks. Since all the courts in the
land must keep time with the highest court, the time has come to
inquire whether the controlling clockworks are running faster and
more furiously than need be to do poetic justice to slow-moving
states. 19 I proceed to the inquiry with all deliberate speed from the
vantage point, or rather the disadvantage point, of a state judge.
There is no need of fresh reports to confirm that judicially speaking, all is not quiet along the western front or any other front. Not
so long ago there was more cause than now to be optimistic about the
harmonious integration of federal rules into state criminal procedure.
There was at least grumbling acceptance in the states of constitutional
rules that raised standards of procedure above the misery level of coerced confessions and knowing use of perjured testimony. Reasonable
men knew, or should have known, that in a country of steadily rising
expectations, we could not forever tolerate such gross abuses of justice.
There was even grumbling acceptance of Mapp v. Ohio in 1961,20 for
when roughly half the states already had an equivalent rule,21 the
inhabitants of sister states could hardly complain that they had been
taken by surprise.
Nevertheless, Mapp v. Ohio, for all the predictability of its basic
rule, was clouded with enough obscurities to confound the most cooperative state courts. It left in limbo the plain question, lately settled,
23
of retroactivity. 22 It left in limbo the problem of harmless error. It

18 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Dux L.J., 319, 323-24
(footnotes in original omitted).
19 See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALiF. L.
R~v. 929, 930 (1965).
20 See, e.g., Inbau, Law Enforcement, The Courts, and Individual Civil Liberties, in
CRIMINAL JUsTIcE iN OUR T mE 97, 120 (Howard ed. 1965).
21 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
22 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
23 See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 385-
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left in limbo the still troublesome problem of the power of federal
courts to upset final judgments of state courts on writs of habeas
corpus. 24 It left in limbo the confusing question of when federal rules
should displace state rules in determining whether a search or seizure
was unreasonable. 25 It made no mention of the hopeless confusion in
the federal rules themselves. 26
There were other rules that joined with Mapp v. Ohio to roam at
large in the fifty states. 27 They engendered so much irrational fear,
particularly among those who automatically mistrust anything that dis86, 384 P.2d 1001, 1005, 3 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 (1963), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 945 (1964);
64 Colum. L. Rev. 367 (1964).
24 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 891 (1963); Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
25 Two years later, in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 28 (1963), the Court held that although the standard of reasonableness is the same under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, "The States are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules
governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not
violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.
... Id. at
33-34. It also pointed out that "the demands of our federal system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible because of our supervisory powers over
federal courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United States Constitution," and it recognized that in some cases the question of reasonableness itself
may turn on compliance with statutory rules that might constitutionally vary. Ibid.
Thus, in applying the rule that a search incident to a lawful arrest may be made without a warrant, it stated: "This Court, in cases under the Fourth Amendment, has long
recognized that the lawfulness of arrests for federal offenses is to be determined by reference to state law insofar as it is not violative of the Federal Constitution. Miller v.
United States, supra; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 15, n.5 (1948). A fortiori, the lawfulness of . . . arrests by state officers for
state offenses is to be determined by . . . [state] law" 374 U.S. at 37.
In a recent opinion I noted: "Ker v. California has now recognized that the purpose
of the distinction between constitutional and supervisory rules is to separate fundamental
civil liberties, which the states must respect, from federal procedural rules, which the
states may ignore. Opinions written before this distinction assumed its present crucial
importance may have to be reinterpreted in the light of 'the demands of our federal
system.'" People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 664, 668, 408 P.2d 108, 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782
(1965); see also Friendly, supra note 19, at 938-40. It follows that "before a state rule
governing police conduct may be struck down, it must appear that neither Congress nor
a state legislature could authorize it. If a state adopts rules of police conduct consistent
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and if its officers follow those rules,
they do not act unreasonably within the meaning of the amendment although different
rules may govern federal officers." People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 452, 380 P.2d 658,
660, 80 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1963).
26 See Traynor, supra note 18, at 329-33.
27 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntariness of confession must not be
tried by jury that tries guilt); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
(compulsion of testimony by one jurisdiction requires immunity from prosecution based
on compelled testimony in all jurisdictions); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (extension
of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)
(extension of right to evidentiary hearing for state prisoners in federal habeas corpus
proceeding).
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turbs their routine ways, that many thoughtful observers hesitated to
voice rational misgivings lest their own voices would become commingled with the emotional hue and cry. 28 The time finally came, however, when even such taciturn observers could no longer remain tacit
in view of a mounting crisis. 29 We confront that crisis now in the constitutional rules that reach out to govern police interrogation.
These rules compel us to take a new look at the rules that have
evolved on confessions, for they are the other side of the coin. Under
the fifth amendment" and similar provisions in virtually all state constitutions, 31 one accused of crime can remain silent and thus compel
the state to assume the entire burden of proving his guilt. In theory,
this privilege against self-incrimination is a mighty defense against conviction of guilt.
In practice, however, most defendants have not availed themselves
of the privilege. At the trial they often plead guilty because they are
aware there is already a strong case against them. Sometimes they plead
guilty because they are willing to accept just punishment or because
they deem it expedient to give up their right to a trial in exchange for
a reduced charge or lesser sentence. 32 There is nothing wrong with
such pleas, in effect judicial confessions, if they have not been induced
by antecedent illegal conduct of police or prosecutors.
Likewise, there is nothing wrong with extrajudicial confessions that
have been legally obtained. Confessions are such cogent evidence of guilt
33
that they often serve to induce pleas of guilty or to expedite trials.
Hence police and prosecutors routinely seek to elicit them by interrogation and often succeed.3 4 There is always a high risk of direct or in28 See Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo. L. REv. 181 (1966).

See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 19.
30 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CONST., amend. V.
31 The exceptions are Iowa and New Jersey. In Iowa the privilege has been read
into the state constitution by the courts. Amana Society v. Seltzer, 250 Iowa 380, 94
N.W.2d 337 (1959); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902). In New Jersey
the privilege has been adopted by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17, 19 (Supp. Oct.
1965). See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
32 See Traynor, supra note 28, at 188.
33 On the role of confessions in law enforcement compare Sobel, The Exclusionary
Rules in the Law of Confessions, A Legal Perspective-A PracticalPerspective, Part VI,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 22, 1965, pp. 1, 4-5, with Statements of former New York City Police
Chief Michael Murphy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 196A, p. 1, col. 5, and Statements of New
York County District Attorney Frank Hogan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.
34 Tactics of interrogation to elicit confessions are set forth in many police manuals.
See ARTHUR AND CAPUTO, INTERROGATION FOR INVESTIGATORS (1959); INBAU & REID, CR1m29

INAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); INBAU AND REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIM-

INAL INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953); KiMD, POLICE INTERROGATION (1940); MuLBAR, INTERROGATION (1951); O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956). For critical
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direct coercion in such a process, however, because of its secrecy.3 5 Such
excessive violations as have come to the attention of the United States
Supreme Court have prompted it to formulate exclusionary rules directed against overreaching inquisition.
Until the Escobedo case the touchstone of admissibility under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was the voluntariness
of the confession. The case for exclusion is clearest when police or
prosecutors have resorted to procedures that might induce a false and
hence an untrustworthy confession. Violence or threats of violence
against the accused or those close to him may induce a false confes37
sion. 8 Promises of leniency may also have this effect.
Untrustworthiness, however, has rarely been the sole reason for excluding an involuntary confession. Even the earliest cases adumbrate
an enlarged test of due process transcending the simple one of untrustworthiness. 38 Though the Court invoked untrustworthiness as a basis
for exclusion, it took care to note the "fundamental unfairness" of
oppressive tactics and their demoralizing effect on human dignity.3 9
comments thereon see Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 5-8, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17
trrEas L. REV. 728 (1963); Weisberg, Police Interrogationof Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 21, 22-26 (1961), reprinted in PoLIcE PowER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

153, 155-58 (Sowle ed. 1962).

"In the police station a prisoner is surrounded by known hostile forces. He is disoriented from the world he knows and in which he finds support. He is subject to
coercing impingements, undermining even if not obvious pressures of every variety.
In such an atmosphere, questioning that is long continued--even if it is only repeated
at intervals, never protracted to the point of physical exhaustion-inevitably suggests
that the questioner has a right to, and expects, an answer. That is so, certainly, when
the prisoner has never been told that he need not answer and when, because his commitment to custody seems to be at the will of his questioners, he has every reason to
believe that he will be held and interrogated until he speaks." Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 575-576 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
38 See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
'143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
37 Experts on interrogation agree that confessions elicted by promises of leniency
should be inadmissible. See INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 112
(1962); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
483-484 (1964); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
38 The earliest Supreme Court case to discuss the underlying rationale for exclusion
was Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). In his opinion for the court, Mr. Justice
Roberts observed that "the aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it
was voluntarily made is to exclude false evidence." He went on to state that "the aim
of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to
prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false." Id. at 236.
He apparently envisaged two confession rules: a rule of evidence excluding untrustworthy
confessions and a constitutional rule banning unfair pressures even if the resulting
confession is reliable.
89 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 159-60 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
35
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The Court also took note of the marked contrast between the orderly
and open procedures of the courtroom and the often unruly and secret
procedures of the police. 40 In recent cases the Court has clearly graduated to this broadened concept of due process.4 1
Sometimes the police have pursued their interrogation not only
without legal authority, but in deliberate violation of specific provisions of federal or state law. Thus there have been violations of rule
5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and comparable state
statutes and rules of court.42 Under rule 5(a) an arrested person must
be brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." Apparently the police have nevertheless acted on the belief that they could
obtain more confessions by violating the rule than by obeying it, a
plain inference from their vehement objections to the McNabbMallory rule.43 They continue their violations in the states with impunity, for only Michigan and Connecticut have adopted an equivalent of the McNabb-Mallory rule to deter violations of their own
44
prompt-arraignment statutes or rules of court.
40 In the early case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), Mr. Justice Black's
opinion for the Court stated, "It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land,
conducted as our courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in
relays to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-examination for thirty-six
hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a 'voluntary' confession. Nor can we,
consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a confession where
prosecutors do the same thing away from the restraining influences of a public trial
in an open court room." Id. at 154. In amplification he quoted the Supreme Court of
Arizona: "The aid of counsel in preparation would be farcical if the case could be
foreclosed by a preliminary inquisition which would squeeze out conviction or prejudice
by means unconstitutional if used at the trial." Id. at 155 n.10. It does not follow that
behavior outside the courtroom must conform precisely to the meticulous procedures
of the courtroom. Otherwise all convictions based on coerced confessions would be reversed whenever the behavior of the police did not correspond to the required behavior
of the prosecutor in the courtroom. See Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and
Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to
, in CRIMINAL JUSTcE IN OUtR TIME 1, 12-13 (1965). Nevertheless, police procedures
must not do violence to rights observed in the courtroom. See Comment, The Coerced
Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 313, 320-25 (1964).
41 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
42 Consistent violations are set forth in ALI MODEL CoDE or PRE-ARRAINMENT PROcEDutE, 135-36 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
43 See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 43 (1944); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements
in the Federal Criminal Code of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 124 (1958). See also Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rsv. 442, 459-60 (1948); Scott, The Mallory Decision and the
Vanishing Rights of Crime Victims, Police, July-August, 1960, p. 28; Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence-Results of the McNabb Case, 42 MIcHr. L. REv. 909 (1944).
44 People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-1(c) (Supp. 1964).
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The McNabb-Mallory rule represents an attempt to diminish the
problem of judging whether a confession is voluntary as well as to
deter official lawlessness. The Court has yet to extend the rule to the
states, 4 but few would dispute that it has more than filled the breach,
not merely by ruling that prolonged detention may be inherently coercive, 46 but also by establishing a right to counsel at the prearraign47

ment stage.

Thus one finds in the coerced confession cases intermingling strains:
a rule of evidence on untrustworthiness expanded into a rule with
constitutional overtones; a constitutional rule, phrased in terms of due
process, at first bearing close kinship to the rule on untrustworthiness
but gradually quitting itself of so narrow a compass; and a federal rule
designed to foster observance of prompt arraignment. There is still
another strain running through the cases, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It has made history, and it is still making news.
The privilege against self-incrimination was first applied to a confession out of court in a federal prosecution in Brain v. United States48
in 1897. For many years thereafter the United States Supreme Court
consistently refrained from extending the privilege to the states under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 49 but there were
portents in the cases that there would be such an evolution. 50 It materialized in Malloy v. Hogan5' in 1964. The evolution was fostered,
as Mr. Justice Brennan noted in his opinion for the Court, by the
gradual shift in the basis for the exclusion of coerced confessions from
the purported untrustworthiness of such testimony to grounds of due
process that in time became virtually indistinguishable from the privilege against self-incrimination. 52 Once the privilege was clearly recognized as operative to inhibit state police interrogations, it was a fortiori applicable to inhibit interrogations in state judicial proceedings.
By the time Malloy v. Hogan extended the fifth amendment to the
states the sixth amendment had also made news. In Gideon v. Wainnote 8 supra.
46 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
47 See note 4 supra.

45 See

48 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Compare Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912).
49 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

50 See Haynes v. Washington, 378 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49, 51 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 583 n25 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.); id. at 639 (Douglas J., concurring); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 n.3 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n.9 (1944).

51 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
52 Id. at 6-9.
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wright53 the United States Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to state defendants. In Massiah v. United States54 it held that the
right to counsel does not await formal judicial proceedings, but arises
when the defendant is indicted. It was against this background that
the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois55 announced a right to counsel before
indictment, and held inadmissible a suspect's damaging statement elicited by police interrogation in the absence of counsel.
The case might well have been decided under existing rules. In
extending the right to counsel to the prearraignment stage, the Court
promulgated a rule not only of dim contours but also of hazy constitutional derivation from the sixth amendment.5 6 Though there had been
a drift in this direction,5 7 there was scant warning that the Court would
so swiftly take command of an area that the states might well have
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
55 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
56 "In
assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT., amend. VI.
57 In 1958 the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the contention that there
was an absolute right to counsel during police interrogation. Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). There were sharp dissents by
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan, who insisted that such
denial of counsel was a deprivation of due process. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. at
443-44. When the Court considered the same question in the context of a suspect who
had been indicted, Mr. Justice Stewart added his vote to those of the Crooker and Cicenia
dissenters and urged that there was an absolute right to counsel after indictment. Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959). Chief Justice Warren, however, voted with those
Justices who reversed Spano's conviction, on the ground that the totality of the circumstances revealed that his confession was coerced. There were thus five Justices who, in
one case or another, had supported a rule that would exclude confessions obtained
after a denial of a request for counsel once an indictment had been returned.
The states, meanwhile, were attempting to develop workable solutions to the right to
counsel problem. The New York Court of Appeals, in accord with Mr. Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Spano, held that a defendant who is interrogated by the police after indictment has an absolute right to counsel even in the absence of a request for counsel.
People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960). The New York
court held that an interrogation that did not conform to this rule deprived the accused
not only of his right to the assistance of counsel, but also of his right to be free from
testimonial compulsion. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 564, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447,
216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74 (1961). The rule was soon extended to statements made after arraignment but before indictment. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962). When the inevitable confrontation of the problems during prearraignment interrogation arrived, the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant's rights were violated only when he had specifically requested counsel or when retained
counsel was denied the opportunity to confer with the defendant. People v. Donovan,
13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). See also People v. Gunner, 15
N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the DiBiasi rule, see State v. Kristich, 226 Ore.
240, 359 P.2d 1106 (1961), as did the concurring opinion in People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d
135, 165, 367 P.2d 680, 698, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 58 (1961).
53
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undertaken to develop comprehensively. Reasonable men could hardly
foresee that the provinces would be deemed delinquent in their due
process for failing to take one great leap from the right to counsel at
trial to a right to counsel before arraignment.
There is no predicting whether such rules governing detention will
prove to be angels or fallen angels of due process, but at this juncture
they bear a pointed resemblance to devil's advocates. We can at least
give them their due by conceding them a shock value of potential
benefit; they could serve to quicken the states to modernize their criminal procedures. One can then expect much soul searching as to just
how expansive a due we want in the moving picture of due process.
Most lawyers are familiar with the sound track of the current serial,
and I quote it here only that we may register how sweetly reasonable
are its sounds before noting how diabolically elusive are its grounds.
The rule of Escobedo v. Illinois reads:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police cusfody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not
effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to
remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of
Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . and that no statement elicited by the police

during the interrogation may be used against him at a crim5s
inal trial.
I have no quarrel with the result in the Escobedo case, given its facts.
The Court's reliance on the sixth amendment under cover of the fourteenth, however, apparently makes available to any suspect a full-blown
right to counsel at the incipient accusatory stage when police interrogation shifts from general inquiry to a probe focusing upon him. The
Court was unconcerned with the problem of selecting which moment
in time to impale as the crucial moment of focus. Even more disconcerting to the front lines, it gave no heed to spelling out any exceptions to a full-blown right to counsel. Does the right arise in the police
station, in the police wagon, or in the street? Does it apply to all possibilities of incrimination such as voice identifications, fingerprints,
handwriting exemplars, or blood tests?59 Though a judge may invoke
378 U.S. at 490-91.
59 See People v. Graves, 64 A.C. 216, 411 P.2d 114, 49 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1966).
58
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the privilege of not answering such questions outside of working hours,
he is bound on the job to do so.
At least one thing seems clear: the Court could hardly have intended
to limit the right to those who had requested counsel, for it would then
turn on the incantation, knowing or naive, of the magic words calling
for counsel. Such a reading would not be consonant with the Court's
own recent decisions on the sixth amendment right. 60 In faithfulness
to these decisions as well as to the Escobedo decision, the California
Supreme Court accordingly felt bound to hold in People v. Dorado6'
that the right to counsel established in the Escobedo case did not turn
on a request for counsel.
A faithful state court feels bound thus to take the supreme law of
the land at face value, however veiled the rationale and hence however
vulnerable to liquidation or revision. It cannot fly in the face of that
veiled face value, even though its superior is free to discount it at any
time. Though it may struggle to give intelligible local application to
such a text as the Escobedo opinion, the public grows understandably
restive at taking program of sweeping reach without adequate warning or explanation from the original promulgators. They do not ask
for a promptbook, but only for clear and orderly transitions in the
progressive spelling of due.
Given the now widely recognized need for more light on the whole
area of police procedures, the fixation of the Escobedo rule on the
sixth amendment right to counsel may have been intended as a miracle of floodlighting. Instead, it achieved a success in flooding the area
rather than lighting it, beyond the visions of even such a demon as
Till Eulenspiegel. Perhaps there was a more limited intention, to set
in rapid motion the privilege against self-incrimination at the detention stage in sequence of the Court's recognition in Malloy v. Hogan
that the privilege had long been operative at that stage, even if not
under its own name.62 The Escobedo opinion itself suggests such a
concern with the fifth amendment. 63 When it reached instead for the
60 A request for counsel is a "formality upon which [defendant's] right may not be
made to depend." Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514 (1962), and cases there cited.
See Note, 19 RuTGERs L. REv. 111 (1964).
61 62 Cal. 2d 338, 898 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1964), cert. denied, 881 U.S. 987
(1965).
62 See note 50 supra.
63 Escobedo v. Illinois, 878 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1964). If the Court's concern was to
protect Escobedo's privilege against self-incrimination, the denial of his request to
consult with his counsel might have been viewed as vitiating the privilege. Escobedo had
made clear that he wished the advice of counsel before answering questions. His privilege
not to answer was violated when the police disregarded his wishes and overwhelmed him
by secret interrogation that included false accusations.
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sixth amendment right to counsel, it- unhappily put everything at
sixes and sevens within the fourteenth.
Even assuming the possibility of waiver of the right to counsel, the
64
police may be reluctant to determine so disputable a legal question.
Accordingly, they may hesitate to elicit evidence from a suspect that
he is willing or even eager to divulge. The adage is particularly pertinent here that he who hesitates is lost. Thus if the police fail to
make prompt inquiry into a suspected criminal conspiracy, they risk
losing what might be their only opportunity to obtain evidence of
such a conspiracy. Nevertheless they may still be unwilling to question any suspected conspirator unattended by counsel, for if they then
ran counter to the Escobedo rule they would immunize the suspect
from prosecution on the basis of the evidence he divulged that afforded grounds for prosecution.
So rudely turned are the tables that the police must now confront
any suspect with diffidence, instead of the other way round. There
can be real damage to an innocent suspect in consequence. It sometimes happens that an innocent person is arrested lawfully, though in
error; he can be promptly released only if the police have some latitude to question him and in that way learn that he should be released.
To constrain reasonable questioning may work to constrain the innocent.6 5 In lieu of interrogation that could have cleared an innocent
suspect, the police are likely to resort to formal charges to hold him
in custody until such time as he is attended by counsel, either retained
by him or provided for him if he is indigent. 66
If the police fail deliberately or inadvertently to advise him of his
right to counsel, a knowing suspect could misuse due process by freely
making incriminating admissions and then invoking the sixth amendment at the trial to escape their consequences. Caught between such
a devil and the deep waves of the sixth amendment, the police might
64 There is a presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). An accused who
waives his right to counsel in the police station may later claim that the waiver was
not voluntary. The court will then have to determine, ordinarily from contradictory
testimony, whether the accused "intelligently and knowingly waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to counsel....
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490

n.14 (1964). See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HAav. L. Rlv. 935, 1006-07

(1966).
65 See AL
1966).

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARR AIGNMENT PROCEDURE

144-46 (Tent. Draft. No. 1,

66 There are obvious difficulties in providing for the presence of counsel in the stationhouse whenever the police may have occasion to question a suspect. See ALI MODEL
CODE OF PE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE

§ 5.07, comment at 191 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966);

Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois,
49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 78 (1964); Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1046 (1964).
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eventually retreat into an indifference to their responsibilities no less
foreboding for the integrity of criminal procedure than excesses of
zeal.
Their major frustration arises from the satanic two-pronged question of the Escobedo rule. When does an investigation cease to be "a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime"? When does it begin "to focus
on a particular suspect"? There is more of Lucifer than of luciferousness in a rule that compels a police officer, even under emergency
conditions, to make so finespun a determination. In the very case
where it formulated so nebulous a test, the Supreme Court quit itself
of another nebulous test, namely, the two-pronged voluntary-involuntary test of admissibility of a confession. It was quite a jump from the
frazzled touchstone of involuntariness to the brimstone fire of focus.
Consider the questions within the question of Focus, Focus, on the
spot: What is due process? What is not? Imagine yourself a police officer confronting one or more suspects. You may also be speculating on
a number of hypotheses to solve the crime. Will you be held to a
strictly objective standard of reasonableness or to a more lenient standard comparable to the best business judgment test?6 7 Given the reluctance of courts to question the judgment of corporate directors,
on the grounds of the complexities of business, will they also be reluctant to question the judgment of police officers because of the complexities and perplexities of crime detection?
The complexities and perplexities are endless. For example, suppose you catch someone in the act of robbery, who becomes the accused
with respect to that crime and is also a suspect with respect to similar
unsolved crimes. Under the Escobedo rule your interrogation cannot
be of a piece, because in the first situation there is a right to counsel,
though in the second there is not. Can you organize your interrogation
in compartments with a view to uncovering information on the unsolved robberies?
Suppose, instead, you capture someone in the act of committing a
crime, and wish now to question him for the purpose of apprehending
his confederates. Is your focus already so intently upon him that even
such questioning would be encompassed within the focus?
Suppose you come upon a person in illegal possession of narcotics
who may be of greater interest to the police in the investigation of the
narcotics traffic than as an accused. If you proceed to interrogate him
in that broader context, have you also focused upon him, thereby fixing the moment of his right to counsel?
67

See 3

ed. 1965).

FmzrcHE,

CycoPrI

OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §

1039 (Penn.
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So vague a test for the right to counsel as the moment of focus is
bound to engender continual disputation on a point in time, when
the concern should be with the overall fairness of police interrogation.
Neither should the right to counsel turn on a moment arbitrarily
fixed as the beginning of judicial proceedings, such as the moment of
arrest or custody.68 In 1961, before Mlassiah v. United States69 and
McLeod v. Ohio70 held that the right to counsel arises no later than
indictment, I rejected such a marker as formulistic. Moreover, I noted
that "if the suspect is in custody before indictment, the police could
easily frustrate the rule by delaying the indictment. ....-71 Even assuming that such a formula might prevail to mark the time when a
right to counsel materialized, I took the view that the right to counsel
would not invariably compel the presence of counsel at a police interrogation of the accused.
The United States Supreme Court decided otherwise. The Massiah
and McLeod cases hold that once the right to counsel materializes,
the accused cannot be questioned in the absence of counsel unless he
has effectively waived his right. Presumably the right could materialize
also when a warrant for the arrest of the accused has issued or when
he has been brought before a judicial officer following his arrest without a warrant. The logical corollary, to forestall evasion of the rule,
seems just around the corner. The right to counsel should now logically materialize whenever the accused was not, but should have been,
brought before a judicial officer.
It is a fair speculation that some of the confusion engendered by
the Escobedo opinion could have been obviated had the Court based
its decision on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination instead of on the sixth amendment right to counsel. There was
already a coherent progression of cases based on the fifth amendment
whose evolutionary rationale could appropriately have been extended
to the Escobedo case.7 2 Moreover, every state except Iowa and New
Jersey already had an equivalent of the fifth amendment in its own
constitution, and even New Jersey had a comparable provision in its
73
statutes.
68 People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 185, 164, 367 P.2d 680, 697-98, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 57-58
(1961) (concurring opinion).
69 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
70381 U.S. 356 (1965).
71 People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 164, 367 P.2d 680, 698, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 58 (1961)
(concurring opinion).
72 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1964); Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79
HARv. L. REv. 21, 30-31, 85-37 (1965).
73 See note 31 supra.
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Once Malloy v. Hogan established that the privilege against selfincrimination operated with the force of the United States Constitution in both state judicial proceedings and in state police interrogations, its logic could have been extended to the Escobedo case to
preclude secret inquisition resistant to proof of coercion. Since the police can easily act without authority, a suspect could with even greater
logic invoke the privilege within their arcane confines than in the
openly regulated courtroom. It is casuistic to pretend that because
74
the police have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind,
there is nothing to counteract and hence no need of a privilege against
self-incrimination during police interrogation.7 5
The fifth amendment has long been the life of the party in judicial
or legislative proceedings, but it has had no life it could call its own
in the prearraignment stage. Prosecutors seemed disposed to live happily ever after with this double standard. It eased their heavy burden
of proof byond a reasonable doubt at the trial if they could preassemble the evidence before trial, at no great risk of detection, with the
suspect's unwilling or unwitting self-incrimination. 6 Even as to gross
violations of the privilege it was the exception rather than the rule
when the double standard came to light in an occasional test case.
On each such occasion the wails of law enforcement officers and the
reinforcing public chorus of woe spoke volumes as to the prevalence
77
of the double standard.
Did we or did we not believe in the privilege against self-incrimination? There was never a real confrontation of the question so long as
there was a double standard of the privilege. Although we took it for
granted that suspects did incriminate themselves at the prearraignment
stage in fear or ignorance, so that in the courtroom they were already
74 See McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional
Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. Cams. L., C. & P.S. 138,
151-52 (1960); Comment, 31 U. Cm. L. RE~v. 556, 559-65 (1964); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
210, 248-49 (1963).
75 See Kamisar, supra note 40, at 12-19.
76 "Those who generations from now set out to write the history of our legal institutions will puzzle over a framework of criminal justice, which, during a public trial
before an impartial judge with defense counsel present to give aid, will not suffer the
defendant to be asked a single question without his consent. And yet that same legal
system will condone the relentless questioning in secret at all hours of the day and
night of that same defendant with only those whose duty it is to ensnare him to determine where the line between fair and foul is to be drawn. This is a tragic indictment
of contemporary society. The preaching of one thing and the practicing of another is
often one of the first warnings of socal decay." Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule:
Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. LJ. 1, 25-26 (1958). See Packer, Two Models of
the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
'77 See Traynor, supra note 28 at 197-98.
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damned by their own admissions, we guarded their privilege in court
with great ceremony. There they could keep their golden silence.
The gold standard began to appear questionable only when it threatened to become a single standard, applicable at the prearraignment
stage as well as in court. One seldom heard, however, that we should
give thought to going off the gold standard by revising the fifth amendment to permit some degree of self-incrimination in open procedures,
whether at the trial or pretrial stage.7 8 That might have seemed too
much like removing the picture of a venerable ancestor out of its
ornate frame in the parlor and reclaiming the unfinished sketch in
the basement, with a view to framing both within harmonious modem borders the better to display their resemblance. We have resisted
making either transformation, because we have grown uncritically
accustomed to the ornate frame and until recently we have been indifferent to the unfinished sketch.
Should there now be a development of the inchoate privilege against
self-incrimination at the prearraignment stage, much would be gained
and nothing lost if it were developed, not as an identical twin of the
privilege in judicial or legislative proceedings, but as a workable
counterpart.
A workable counterpart must strike a common-sense balance between a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination and the community's right to legitimate police investigation, not only to discover
who has perpetrated a crime, but to rule out who has not. There must
be a middle ground in due process that affords fair protection to an
individual against the state without thwarting efforts of the state to
pursue the investigation of crime. On such a middle ground we could
establish a correlation between trial and ,prearraignment procedures
that might well operate to bring a pervasive openness to prearraignment procedures in which rules could operate with reasonable flexibility instead of as martinets. Such an environment would of itself militate
against more than such gross abuses as coerced confessions. It would
militate against techniques that insidiously impel a suspect to make
admissions with blunted awareness of their damaging effect71 It would
78 Such a procedure was suggested by Kauper, Judicial Examination of the AccusedA Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MicH. L. REv. 1224 (1932), and Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. GCM. L., C. & P.S. 1014 (1934).
A similar procedure was proposed for South Africa by a judge of the Supreme Court
of South Africa. See Hiemstra, Abolition of the Right Not To Be Questioned, 80 S.A.L.J.

187 (1963).
79 "Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an admission of 'mere' complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission
of firing of the fatal shots. Illinois v. Escobedo, 28 Ill.2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963). The
'guiding hand of counsel' was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate
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militate even against techniques that impel a suspect to make admissions in awareness of their damaging effect but in ignorance of his
privilege not to incriminate himself or in hopelessness that he could
in fact exercise that privilege.
Meanwhile, we must do the best we can to insure common-sense
application of the Supreme Court rules that now dominate the scene.
Thus it would be consonant with the privilege against self-incrimination to leave the police free to hear and act upon volunteered confessions, for as Mr. Justice White has observed, an accused has no
"constitutional right not to incriminate himself by making voluntary
disclosures."8' 0 It would also seem sensible not to constrain the police
with rules that would mechanically imitate such trial rules as the one
that prohibits a prosecutor from even calling a defendant to the
stand.8 That rule, designed to protect a defendant from adverse inferences that a jury might draw from his refusal to testify, is appropriate to a trial whose outcome might otherwise be determined by
such inferences. No comparable rule should be necessary when there
is no one but the police to draw adverse inferences from a suspect's
refusal to answer questions, for they are powerless to render a verdict.
Moreover, he could be readily protected at the trial from such inferences by a rule precluding the prosecution from interpreting silence
in the face of police accusation as an adoptive admission. Silence during police interrogation, which is still far from the protective openness and formalities of a court trial, may be attributable to a variety
of causes. The accused may not have heard or understood the accusation, or he may have felt there was no need to reply. He may have
deemed it prudent to remain silent for fear of reprisals from others.
He may simply have beer! averse to replying under the circumstances
of his detention. I would hence welcome a rule that would protect
82
silence at the pretrial stage from invidious interpretation at the trial.
situation. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486
(1964). It is one thing for an accused to make a free choice to speak without first obtaining advice as to the legal effect of his statements. It is quite another for the police
deliberately to make it impossible for him to obtain legal advice.
80 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 497 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
81 No court has allowed the accused to be asked questions without his consent. Case
authority is sparse because the rule is so widely assumed. See United States v. Housing
Foundation of America, 176 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949); People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App.
2d 650, 245 P.2d 663 (1952); 8 WiGMORE, EvEDENcE § 2268 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
82 The prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand at trial does
not constitute evidence. It "does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving
every essential element of the crime and the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 449-50, 398 P.2d 753, 761, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 435
(1965). In contrast, silence during interrogation would constitute substantive evidence
as an adoptive admission, thereby becoming an element in the state's case against the
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It may be worth noting that I find no inconsistency in remaining
of the opinion that a judge or prosecutor might fairly comment upon
the silence of a defendant at the trial itself to the extent of noting
that a jury could draw unfavorable inferences from the defendant's
failure to explain or refute evidence when he could reasonably be
expected to do so. Such comment would not be evidence and would
do no more than make clear to the jury the extent of its freedom in
drawing inferences. I have said as much in People v. Modesto,8 3 but
the opinion proved to be only the next to the last words in my state.
4
It is now displaced by the famous last words of Griffin v. California."
As we reflect on the problem of giving common-sense application
to the privilege against self-incrimination at the prearraignment stage,
we turn once more to Malloy v. Hogan, which definitively extended
the privilege to state trials. It emphasizes the right of an accused "to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will."85 The counterpart of such a privilege at the prearraignment stage could be readily safeguarded if the prosecution were required to lay a foundation for the admission of incriminating statements or confessions by setting forth all the circumstances of the
suspect's custody and the details of all interrogations to prove that
he was fully aware of his right to remain silent and that the police
in no way interfered with "the unfettered exercise of his own will."
It would ordinarily be incumbent upon the police who arrested a suspect to inform him meaningfully, as soon as possible thereafter, of
his right to remain silent.86
accused. Moreover, the prosecution would introduce the accusation to explain the significance of the defendant's silence. Some police officials have read detailed and vivid
descriptions of the crime to the defendant together with an accusation that he is the
guilty party. If the defendant remains silent and the accusation is introduced as explanation, the jury would have before it a vast amount of hearsay evidence otherwise inadmissible. Even if the jury were charged not to consider this hearsay alone as tending
to prove guilt, the possible prejudicial effect is obvious. See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.
2d 699, 716-17, 172 P.2d 18, 27-28 (1946); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 660 at 1099
(11th ed. 1935); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 74, at 212-13.
83 62 Cal. 2d 436, 450-53, 398 P.2d 753, 761-63, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 425-27 (1965).
84 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
85 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
86 Such a rule should not be operative in emergencies, however, as when the police
must elicit information from an accused to save life. In such a case in California, we held
that the failure of the police to warn the accused of his right to remain silent and his
right to counsel did not render inadmissible statements made by the defendant after his
victim had disappeared but before her body had been discovered. "They were freely and
voluntarily made at a time when the officers were concerned primarily with the possibility of saving (the victim's] life." The paramount interest was to save her life. People
v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 446, 398 P.2d 753, 759, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 423 (1965).
Such an emergency illustrates the need for flexible rules that take account of interests
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The United States Supreme Court would then be the final arbiter
of any constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of proof or to procedures governing the admissibility of evidence. If it determined that
disputed parol testimony, such as is common in the coerced confession
cases, was so inadequate as to endanger the privilege against selfincrimination, it could require higher standards of proof. Conceivably
it could require the police to -make either tape or verbatim stenographic recordings of interrogations and to maintain routine written
records of the custody of suspects showing the time and place of interrogation sessions.8 7 Such records would go far to dispel doubts that
the police can be relied upon to advise suspects meaningfully of their
rights.
On the basis of such records a court could adjudge the validity of
police procedures in the light of what happened, instead of in the
dark of what might or might not have happened. 8 It could intelligently determine whether there had been any real violation of the
suspect's privilege in the context of the whole record. If it appeared,
for example, that he was a criminal lawyer well aware of his constitutional rights, a failure to alert him to his privilege would neither
diminish his own awareness thereof nor interfere with "the unfettered
exercise of his own will."
Moreover, reliable records would go far to mitigate the evils of
secret procedures. They would give some assurance that the normally
awesome environment in which a suspect confronts officials of the
state would be tempered to induce in him respect for the law rather
than dread of its representatives. They would redound to the benefit
of the police as well as the suspect by strengthening the foundation
for the admissibility in court, in the event of trial, of whatever statements a suspect chose to make of his own will.
An advance toward uniform minimum standards of law enforcement could be expedited by appropriate application of the rules in
superior to those of a suspect in the light of all the circumstances. See the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948); People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779,
797-98, 409 P.2d 222, 234-35, 48 cal. Rptr. 382, 394-95 (1966); People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d
690, 706-07, 408 P.2d 365, 374-75, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918-19 (1965); People v. Schader, 62
Cal. 2d 716, 724, 401 P.2d 665, 670, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (1965). Since the officers acted
lawfully, the court had no basis for invoking an exclusionary rule designed to deter
unlawful police conduct. In judging whether police conduct has been lawful a court
must ask itself the hard question: How otherwise would it have had the police proceed?
87 See Enker & Elsen, supra note 66, at 85, B7; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMErr
PROcEDURE § 4.09 (Tent. Draft. No. 1, 1966).
88 "If one theme runs through the coerced confession cases, it is that the Court does
not know what happened at the police station." Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Ohio ST. L.J. 449, 497 (1964).
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Mapp v. Ohio, Malloy v. Hogan, and Gideon v. Wainwright. The
Mapp rule, giving force to the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures, could operate to preclude
unreasonably long detentions before arraignment 9 and still not frustrate reasonable police inquiry for the purpose of determining whether
a suspect should be formally charged or released. The square recognition in Malloy v. Hogan of a privilege against self-incrimination at
the prearraignment stage gives the suspect formidable protection at
that stage that could in large measure serve in lieu of the right to
counsel. The Gideon rule and its satellites could be amplified to cover
a right to counsel no later than the time the suspect should have been
arraigned, thereby precluding any maneuver to delay his right to counsel by delaying his arraignment.
This report on the devils of due process in criminal detection and
detention leads to a final note on their troublesome Fra Diavolo, the
privilege against self-incrimination at trial. There is no need to review
here the sorry abuses of justice that led at last to the privilege, 0 and
there is not time to analyze the role of a comparable privilege in congressional investigations or other proceedings as a safeguard either
against self-incrimination or against invasions of privacy. 91 It is timely
to recall, however, in relation to the trial, the observation set forth
earlier in relation to the pretrial stage, that recent constitutional rules
militate against a continuing double standard of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
If we illuminate at last the recesses of prearraignment procedures
the better to protect any suspect, is he still to keep truth in the dark
in the open sessions of a trial, where traditional guarantees of fairness
are scrupulously enforced to protect him against accusation that in
any event must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt? Will we in time
abandon our preoccupation with the privilege, as to the usual crimes
not involving beliefs, for an enlarged concern with the overall fairness of criminal procedure? Will we give greater emphasis to the shared
interest of the community and of any suspect, guilty or innocent, in
fair procedure, and less emphasis to the interest of a guilty suspect in
escaping conviction? Would we thereby more effectively counter organized crime without weakening the protection of isolated indi89 See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L.
REV. 483, 569-72 (1963).
90 See Sutherland, supra note 72, at 27-30.
91 See Meltzer, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and Practical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC Scm. 176 (1953); Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some
Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOmiC Sci. 181 (1953); Meltzer, Invoking
the Fifth Amendment-A Rejoinder, 9 BULL. ATOMIC Sci. 185 (1953).
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viduals? No one knows what answer will eventually be made to the
question suggested earlier: Do we or do we not want a boundless
privilege against self-incrimination now that it has doubled itself?
92
That question we leave to the future.
For the present we have enough to do to keep on course with the
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. There is no predicting
whether they will leave latitude in the law for constructive integration
of the studies now under way. It is not too much to hope that the
Supreme Court will formulate the rules with a high sense of responsibility for their far-reaching consequences and will make transitions
from one case to another that keep the peace between the Constitution
and common sense.
As we leave it to its work, we confront the original sin that is the
source of most of the troubles we are now having with the devils of
due process. It is the deadly sin of sloth, long rampant in our own
midst. In the nick of time we can still rouse ourselves to reconstruct
the blighted areas of criminal procedure. The problems are fiendish,
the work diabolic, but the angels should be on our side.
92 The classic critique of the policies behind the privilege against self-incrimination
is still BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827); see also 8 WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE
§ 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

